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Financialization with Chinese characteristics? Exchanges, control & capital 
markets in authoritarian capitalism1 
Johannes Petry 




A growing body of research has analyzed the variegation of financialization processes and 
the role of states as important actors therein.  Contributing to this literature, this paper 
argues that more than important actors facilitating financialization, states can also 
(partially) exert control over, actively manage and shape financialization. In the context 
of China’s variegated financialization process, this paper analyzes the crucial role of 
securities exchanges in the development of China’s capital markets since the global 
financial crisis 2007–09. These state-owned exchanges act as intermediaries between the 
Chinese state, society and finance by shaping the infrastructural arrangements of capital 
markets. Thereby, they facilitate the authorities’ ability to control markets and direct their 
outcomes towards state policies. Financialization is thereby decoupled from a neoliberal 
policy paradigm, and rather than a break with China’s authoritarian capitalism, exchanges 
facilitate state control within and through financialization. 
Keywords: China; financialization; capital markets; securities exchanges; authoritarian 
capitalism; market infrastructures. 
 
Introduction 
Since the global financial crisis 2007–2009 (GFC), capital markets have gradually become 
an important pillar of China’s socio-economic system of authoritarian capitalism. During 
the Third Plenary Session of the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party 
in 2013, the Chinese government officially declared that markets had a ‘decisive role’ to 
play in allocating resources and facilitating growth in the Chinese economy, a position 
that was reaffirmed during the 19th Congress in 2017. With the ongoing process of 
Reform and Opening as well as the rebalancing of China’s economy towards internal 
consumption, the service sector and investment-driven growth, the authorities decided 
to give finance a leading role for national development. 
 
1 Pre-print version of the article accepted for publication in Economy & Society. 
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Consequently, the financial sector expanded rapidly in recent years. Between 
2003–2006 and 2014–2017, the average total value of stocks traded increased from 27.2 
to 193.2 per cent of GDP, market capitalization of listed domestic companies almost 
tripled from 28 to 67 per cent of GDP, while the ratio of market- versus bank-based 
activity increased from 0.2 to 1.091 (World Bank, 2018). From less than 5 per cent in 
2002, securities market financing by Chinese firms increased to 30 per cent of Total 
Social Financing by 2016 (Gabor, 2018; Lu and Sweeney, 2012), while China’s derivative 
markets grew from accounting for <1 per cent of global futures trading in 2002 to 16 per 
cent in 2016 (FIA, 2017). Between 2007 and 2015, the financial sector’s contribution to 
GDP almost doubled from 5 to 9 per cent (Huang and Lardy, 2016). By 2017, China’s 
capital markets had become the 2nd largest stock markets, 2nd largest futures markets 
and 3rd largest bond markets in the world. 
Such processes of capital market development are often described as important 
characteristics of financialization processes. And while not yet on par with highly 
financialized economies such as the United States,2 it becomes clear that ‘many 
phenomena of financialization [are] observable in China’ (Pauls, Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 
& Gottwald, 2016, p. 45), – and that capital markets have become a crucial part in 
China’s political economy, contributing to the increasing financialization of China’s 
authoritarian capitalism (Dal Maso, 2015; Gruin, 2019b; J. Wang, 2017; Y. Wang, 2015). 
Within the literature on financialization, two bodies of research have emerged around 
the variegation of financialization processes (Karwowski and Stockhammer, 2017) and 
the role of states as important actors in facilitating financialization, not only in advanced 
but also in developing economies (Rethel and Thurbon, 2019). Contributing to these 
literatures on variegated financialization and the state, this paper argues that more than 
an important actor in facilitating financialization, the state can also exercise a 
considerable degree of control over financialization processes and thereby shape their 
very form. While finance in China is expanding and permeating evermore aspects of 
economic and political life, in this financialization with Chinese characteristics the 
authorities try to actively manage financialization to achieve developmental goals. 
Importantly, this is not done through brute force or command-and-control mechanisms, 
but through ‘pivotal points’ in market infrastructures that enable the management and 
steering of financialization processes. 
Therefore, this paper analyzes the crucial role of China’s state-owned securities 
exchanges in the development and management of Chinese capital markets between 
2009–2019. More than just marketplaces, as providers of market infrastructures 
exchanges are themselves powerful actors that exercise considerable influence over 
capital markets. The paper argues that while China’s capital markets have rapidly 
developed in recent years, they function differently from and fulfil a different role than 
‘global’ capital markets whose primary function is to enable the generation of private 
profit and who often supersede state logic and constrain state power. What can instead 
be observed in China is that exchanges act as intermediaries between the Chinese state, 
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society and finance by actively managing capital markets. Thereby, they facilitate the 
state’s ability to control capital markets and to direct market outcomes towards the 
accomplishment of certain state policies that aim to perpetuate China’s authoritarian 
capitalism. While the exchanges’ control over capital markets is neither absolute nor 
always effective, this paper aims to showcase a different way of thinking about and 
actively managing capital markets in China where financialization is not necessarily 
linked to neoliberalism. Rather than a break with China’s authoritarian capitalism, the 
activities of the Chinese exchanges help to sustain and facilitate China’s socio-economic 
system by extending state control within and through capital markets, attempting to 
shape the financialization of China’s political economy in accordance with its 
authoritarian capitalism. Thereby, this single case study on China’s capital market 
development sheds light on debates about neoliberal convergence, models of capitalism 
and trajectories of financialization.  
Next to financial news coverage and other secondary data, the paper draws on 
100 expert interviews conducted in mainland China (in total (46); Shanghai (21), Beijing 
(14), other (11)), Hong Kong (39), Frankfurt (6), London (5) and Singapore (4) between 
June 2017 and October 2019. These interviews were conducted with exchanges (53 per 
cent), investors (15 per cent), brokers (11 per cent) and other actors (21 per cent) such 
regulators or clearing houses mainly working in international departments (25 per cent), 
business development (19 per cent), senior management (18 per cent), 
research/strategy (14 per cent) or product development (12 per cent). Interviews were 
conducted with mainland Chinese (46 per cent) Western (41 per cent), Hong Kong (11 
per cent) and other Asian (2 per cent) institutions, while a larger proportion of 
interviewees came from mainland China (57 per cent; in contrast to 10 per cent, 26 per 
cent and 7 per cent from Hong Kong, Western and other Asian countries, respectively). 
These interviews provide important insights into how Chinese exchanges manage capital 
markets, often involving window guidance and informal practices, that cannot be gained 
from document or dataset analyzes but only through in-depth fieldwork. The broad 
interview data sample enables cross-checking the narratives of interviewees from 
different positions within China’s capital markets. Consequently, the practices observed 
in this study are corroborated by multiple interview sources and financial news coverage 
and regulation (if possible). Further, this triangulation of interview data also prevents 
individual narratives to bias the analysis.  
The paper is structured as followed. After this introduction, the existing 
literature on (variegated) financialization and the state is discussed, and how China’s 
variegated financialization is anchored in its socio-economic system of authoritarian 
capitalism which enables the partial steering of financialization processes (section 1). 
This is then demonstrated in the following sections which analyze how exchanges 
manage capital markets with respect to different aspects of China’s socio-economic 
system and direct them: to prevent overspeculation in markets (section 2, financial 
sector); to stabilize the socio-political system (section 3, society); for finance to serve 
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the real economy (section 4, national development); to assist in the reform and 
restructuring of China’s companies (section 5, non-financial sector); and maintaining 
control despite an integration with global markets (section 6). Section 7 concludes. 
 
Financialization with Chinese characteristics: capital markets, state control and 
market management practices 
The development of capital markets has been a core focus of financialization research. 
For Epstein (2005, p. 3), financialization ‘means the increasing role of financial motives, 
financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the 
domestic and international economies’, while Pike and Pollard (2010, p. 30) define 
financialization as the ‘growing influence of capital markets, their intermediaries and 
processes in economic and political life’. Other scholars also attribute a significant role 
to capital markets in financialization processes, be it in the dissemination of market-
based financial activities and practices (Aglietta and Breton, 2001), the rise of 
shareholder value-oriented corporate governance (Williams, 2000), or ‘the increased 
ability to trade risk’ (Hardie, 2012). At the heart of and as a precondition of many aspects 
of financialization stand capital markets and their development. This is not only the case 
when it comes to financialization in advanced economies, but also with respect to the 
study of financialization in developing and emerging economies (see Bonizzi, 2013). This 
literature highlights that financialization processes are not uniform, they are rather 
variegated and refracted by national institutional settings that lead to different 
trajectories of financialization (Dixon, 2011; Karwowski and Stockhammer, 2017). As 
Lapavitsas and Powell (2013, p. 359) emphasized, ‘both the form and the content of 
financialization vary according to institutional, historical and political conditions in each 
country’. This has also been picked up in debates about the relationship between 
financialization and the state. Previously, many scholars argued that financialization 
often results in a relative loss of state power vis-à-vis finance (Strange, 1998) and the 
effects on developing economies are often described as potentially negative with 
financialization for instance decreasing their borrowing capacity and thereby policy 
space (Hardie, 2012) or deepening existing power asymmetries between states (Bortz 
and Kaltenbrunner, 2018). But stemming from earlier discussions on transformations of 
the developmental state, more recent scholarship has highlighted that financial market 
development has often been actively facilitated by states (Thurbon, 2016). It argues that 
an increasing hybridization of financialization processes takes place in which state and 
(quasi-)state institutions often co-constitute financialization processes (see Rethel and 
Thurbon, 2019).  
Contributing to the growing literatures on variegated financialization and the 
state, this paper argues that states are not only important actors facilitating 
financialization but can also exercise a considerable degree of control over 
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financialization, thereby shaping its very form. Instead of a financialization process that 
follows a neoliberal logic and constrains state power (Carroll and Jarvis, 2014), what we 
see in China is a ‘financialization with Chinese characteristics’ where the state actively 
tries to manage financialization and its social outcomes.  
As a result, the authorities attempt to exercise and maintain their power both 
within and through the financialization processes that unfold within China’s socio-
economic system of authoritarian capitalism. With the transition from plan to market, 
new market-based calculations and strategies have emerged for exercising state 
governance (Sigley, 2006). Since the beginning of reforms, China’s authoritarian 
capitalism has relied on both socialist authoritarian practices (e.g. the nomenklatura 
system) and market-based practices (Sum, 2019; Tsai, 2015). And as discussed, since the 
GFC, finance has become an ever more important channel to govern the economy as 
the Chinese authorities have actively facilitated financial development in China’s 
opening up and liberalization strategy and more broadly the transformation of its 
political economy (Collins and Gottwald, 2014; Gruin, 2019a; Li, 2018a). While financial 
markets are growing in importance, this occurs within the context of China’s socio-
economic system of authoritarian capitalism in which the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) aims to maintain its control over socio-economic development, in part by 
managing policy uncertainties through the financial sector. Hereby, one can observe an 
‘exten[sion of] the reach of financial capital, but simultaneously consolidating the 
persistently illiberal authority of the CCP over the use of that capital’ (Gruin, 2016, p. 
27).  
It is important to note that China’s financialization is not a uniform but a 
variegated process unfolding across nearly every aspect of economic life. From P2P-
lending (J. Wang, 2018), the shadow banking sector (Tsai, 2015), corporate governance 
(Y. Wang, 2015), the financialization of everyday investors (Dal Maso, 2015), 
management practices (Chong, 2018), real estate (Theurillat, Lenzer, & Zhan, 2016) to 
the social credit scoring system (Gruin, 2019b). Some aspects of this variegated 
financialization unfold outside of government control, sometimes initially outside of the 
purview of the authorities, temporarily tolerated or even actively encouraged by them 
(J. Wang, 2017). However, at some point the authorities often attempt to reign in 
developments that are deemed socially counterproductive – prominent examples 
include the clampdown on developers in the wake of the housing bubble (Yang, 2017) 
or the deleveraging of the shadow banking sector and attempts to shift these activities 
towards capital markets (Gabor, 2018).  
This steering of financialization processes stems from a fundamentally different 
understanding of finance in China than in the Western world. While the usefulness of 
market-based mechanisms for resource allocation and economic coordination has been 
recognized and facilitated, the authorities also see the downsides of free financial 
markets after experiencing several financial scandals domestically in the 1990s as well 
as intensely studying financial crises and their social and political impacts on other states 
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and societies (e.g. in post-USSR Russia, Japan).3 As McNally (2013, pp. 38–39) argues, 
there is a ‘considerable distrust of markets and full-out economic liberalization’, 
therefore the authorities engage in a ‘pragmatic use’ of markets, managing markets for 
specific policy goals. The authorities attempt to steer financialization, as their rule relies 
on the support of a growing middle class and the promise of continuous economic 
growth (Heurlin, 2016) – which can both be achieved but also hindered by financial 
markets.  
By analysing the role of exchanges in organising Chinese stock and derivative 
markets, this paper demonstrates how the Chinese authorities attempt to partially 
control financialization processes, not through command-and-control measures but by 
utilising exchanges as ‘pivotal points’ through which they manage and steer capital 
markets. Rather than looking at processes of market reform or creation, this paper 
focuses on practices of market management. Through an analysis of the policies and 
practices of exchanges in managing capital markets, we can gain insights in how Chinese 
authorities aim to steer China’s variegated financialization process.4 Thereby, capital 
markets can be understood as a site where the authorities exercise ‘statecraft [through] 
financial control’ which enables them to govern social and economic life (Sum, 2019, p. 
386). Control in this context should be understood both as exerting control within 
financialization by monitoring, regulating and intervening into capital markets, as well 
as exerting control through financialization by directing capital market outcomes 
towards the accomplishment of certain economic and political objectives linked to state 
policies.  
Instead of mere platforms on which market transactions take place, exchanges 
are powerful actors in their own right who actively organize and shape capital markets 
(see Ahrne, Aspers, & Brunsson, 2015; Castelle et al., 2016; Petry, 2020; Wójcik, 2012). 
Rather than investors who are active within a market, exchanges play a much more 
architectural role for capital markets as they create the infrastructural arrangements 
that enable the functioning of these markets (on market infrastructures, see Bernards 
and Campbell-Verduyn, 2019). As MacKenzie (2006, p. 13) states, ‘markets’ 
infrastructures matter’, which he defines as ‘the social, cultural, and technical conditions 
that make [financial markets] possible’. By deciding the ‘rules of the game’ and acting 
as gatekeepers, deciding who gets in, what is traded and how trading is conducted, 
exchanges are crucial to shaping capital markets. From market data and indices, 
listing/creation and trading of various securities, commodities and derivatives, to post-
trading activities such as central clearing, settlement, custodian and collateral 
management services, exchanges are crucial to the functioning of capital markets. 
Therefore, exchanges are important actors that facilitate and shape financialization 
processes (Petry, 2020).  
How exchanges themselves are governed and by whom they are owned matters 
a lot for the kind of markets that they are creating. In most advanced economies, 
exchanges are publicly traded companies, subject to the laws of the market, and they 
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have to make profitable business decisions to increase shareholder value and serve the 
global investment community. But in contrast to being ‘marketized’, exchanges in China 
are rather ‘politicized’. They are government agencies, subordinated to the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) or the People’s Bank of China, and ultimately, 
the Chinese government. The Chinese exchanges also occupy a different position within 
the financial system itself. While global exchanges are subject to competition, Chinese 
exchanges are shielded from external competitors, internal competition is limited and 
they have considerable authority over and within the marketspace – as one interviewee 
working in a global exchange’s China team noted: ‘[in China] the exchange is at the top 
of the food chain’.5 Personnel exchanges (secondments) between the exchanges and 
regulators are a common feature of their organizational setup, and exchange CEOs are 
also appointed by the authorities (see also Heilmann, 2005).6 Instead of 
profit/shareholder value, the performance of exchanges, their personnel and 
management is measured by their contribution towards policy goals. Hence, the 
exchanges are embedded within the structures that permeate China’s authoritarian 
capitalism (Lyu, 2015; ten Brink, 2019). 
This different institutional setup of exchanges has important consequences for 
how they manage capital markets. Chinese exchanges thereby fulfil an important role 
as intermediaries between the Chinese state, society and finance – a role which has 
gained in importance since the increasing post-GFC growth and importance of China’s 
capital markets. These market management practices are not arbitrary but rather aimed 
at directing market outcomes to achieving state policies that target different aspects of 
China’s authoritarian capitalism: to decrease financial risk (financial sector); to stabilize 
the socio-political system through market participation (society); to make finance serve 
the real economy (national development); and to facilitate political-economic reform 
processes (listed companies). Further, these mechanisms stay in place despite an 
increasing inflow of international investors.  
This control of capital markets is of course not absolute. Sometimes 
implemented control efforts fall short of their objectives, regulatory reach is incomplete, 
there are work-arounds in some areas or policy experimentations fail.7 After all, neither 
the Chinese state nor its central institutions such as the CCP are monolithic or all-mighty 
entities (ten Brink, 2019). However, even when control is not absolute, what this paper 
demonstrates is a different way of thinking about capital markets and how they are 
managed through the Chinese state that results in very different market structures and 
consequently different societal effects of financialization processes. As the following 
sections demonstrate, the Chinese exchanges thereby facilitate state control within and 
through capital markets, facilitating and shaping the financialization of China’s political 




Risk: preventing overspeculation 
Speculation is an integral part of financialization processes (Hardie, 2012). While all 
states certainly have the objective to prevent financial risk or ‘overspeculation’, what 
sets China apart is the constant intervention into and active management of capital 
markets through its state-owned exchanges. As one Hong Kong-based Chinese broker 
noted, ‘Chinese markets are the only markets where the exchanges don’t encourage 
speculation; because they are worried about the risk’.8 In order to minimize financial 
risk, a monitoring and intervention system was established with a level of regulatory 
oversight unthinkable in global markets. As Charles Li, CEO of the Hong Kong Exchange 
(HKEx) stated, ‘while Europe is struggling with MiFID II, in China you have MiFID 10’.9 
The exchanges hereby act as intermediaries between the Chinese state and domestic 
finance. 
There are for instance great differences in how exchanges manage market (data) 
access as they decide which market data is available to investors and if there are speed 
or information asymmetries. In global exchanges, market data is available as continuous 
streams and can be bought with different time delays. This provides advantages for 
those professional traders who can operate faster trading systems and are able to co-
locate their servers in exchanges’ data centres or get direct market access (DMA), that 
is to plug directly into exchanges without going through a broker. Thereby, exchanges 
create financial infrastructures that facilitate high frequency trading (HFT) (MacKenzie, 
2018). In contrast, in Chinese stock markets, market data only comes as snapshots (2–4 
times per second), while DMA or co-location are not allowed. As a result, no speed 
asymmetries exist between investors and transaction volumes are decreased. In futures 
markets, HFT is allowed but restricted. While co-location is possible, DMA is not, so that 
every trade that enters an exchange has to go through a Chinese broker (foreign brokers 
are prohibited from operating in China). This also creates responsibilities for brokers to 
ensure their members’ compliance as rule violations would fall back on them.10 This 
setup, the so-called ‘pass-through monitoring system’, allows Chinese exchanges to 
trace every single trade to the original investor (and a Chinese ID card). 
By deciding over available order types and acceptable levels of order 
(cancellation) and position limits, the Chinese exchanges also change the incentive 
structures for certain types of trading. The stock exchanges for instance introduced t+1 
settlement and intraday trading is not possible, effectively preventing HFT. By keeping 
order (cancellation) limits low in futures markets, HFT is also limited as it often relies 
heavily on massive order flows/cancellations. This is not to say that HFT does not exist 
in China, but it is much more constrained than in global markets.11 Further, in both stock 
and futures markets, margins have to be pre-funded, and no portfolio margin offsetting 
exists in futures markets that would lower margins on large trading positions – another 
deliberate move to discourage speculation. 
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Further, when trading in Chinese futures markets, traders have to indicate if 
trades are for hedging or speculative purposes. If investors have reached their position 
limit, additional orders will not be executed by an exchange’s trading system. While 
position limits for ‘spec’ trades are higher for commodity futures, they are nonetheless 
restraining speculative trading. If an investor wants to trade more contracts, this is only 
possible for hedging purposes. Herefore, investors need to apply for hedging quotas 
with individual exchanges and contracts, where the need to hedge an underlying 
position must be sufficiently documented. For commodity futures for instance the 
investor needs to submit evidence for physical commodity deliveries at the respective 
commodity futures exchange, e.g. submit receipts of iron ore shipments. These hedging 
activities are monitored on a daily basis to prevent abuse. If there is a mismatch, e.g. an 
investor traded CSI 300 Futures worth RMB100 million for hedging purposes, but his 
equity position was only worth RMB80 million, the exchanges would punish such 
fraudulent behaviour.12  
However, the exchanges sometimes also fail to achieve their goals as exemplified 
by the 2015 stock market crash. But even their management of such failures reveals a 
different way of managing markets as showcased by CFFEX’s shutdown of the CSI 300 
futures market. After being the world’s most-traded equity index futures in 2015, it was 
killed over night after fears that it would exacerbate the stock market downturn. 
Between 25 August and 2 September 2015, CFFEX increased pre-fundable margins from 
10 to 40 per cent, raised intraday execution fees 100-fold to 23 basis points, lowered 
position limits from 500 to 10 contracts per day, investigated non-complying investors 
and suspended them from trading. As an interviewee who heads the China operations 
of a global exchange noted: ‘That was incisive! Overnight the whole market and all that 
trading volume more or less collapsed by 99 per cent’.13 Such a market intervention 




Figure 1 Daily trading volume for CSI 300 futures market, 2014–2019 (in million contracts; 










The exchanges also constantly monitor trading activities in their ‘transaction 
supervision departments’, with the aim of detecting suspicious trading activities that 
could indicate market manipulation or insider trading.14 The stock exchanges monitor 
the trading of all listed stocks and regularly investigate whether accounts of market 
manipulation occur. When for instance a companies’ stock quickly rises while trading 
volume does not rise accordingly, the exchange will suspect insider trading which can 
lead to an investigation by the exchange or the CSRC. The futures exchanges instead 
monitor certain core figures such as the trading volume to open interest ratio to 
determine whether illicit trading activities take place or whether there is ‘over-
speculation’ in certain products.15 If there is too much speculative trading in a product, 
the exchanges will increase intra-day execution fees or intra-day margins for those 
contracts. Further, they will call top-traders or their brokers, telling them to stop trading 
for the day. As one former Chinese exchange employee told me: ‘You have no idea how 
many calls I gave to these large accounts, telling them to stop trading! […] But it’s not 
written down anywhere, it’s just window guidance’.16 This informal ‘window guidance’ 
is an important element of how exchanges manage markets. 
Non-compliance can also be punished by the exchanges – trades can be annulled 
(or in rare cases even declared illegal), also retrospectively. Investors receive warnings 
and when violating rules repeatedly can even be banned from trading for a certain 
period or lose their trading licence all together.17 As one Chinese broker mentioned, 
‘when you read Futures Daily [a financial newspaper], every day there will be 
announcements of this or that company who has been suspended from trading because 
of rule violations, it happens every day’.18 As a consultant for Chinese exchanges noted, 
these harsh measures have a ‘preventive/pre-emptive effect, stopping these things 
from happening in the first place’19 as (most) investors and brokers aim not to cross this 
line. Of course, this risk management is not always effective as demonstrated by the 
2015 stock market crash. But failing to prevent overspeculation has severe 
consequences for exchange personnel. After the 2015 crash, for instance, several high-
level exchange and regulatory executives were ousted, most prominently CSRC 
Chairman Xiao Gang (see also Naughton, 2017). This demotion system aims to keep 
exchange employees ‘vigilant’ and not stray too far from their public mission.20 
With a growing role of capital markets in China’s economy, as a central feature 
of financialization processes speculation becomes ever more intense with potentially 
destabilising effects. Hence, the discussed measures are in place to prevent 
overspeculation, control the build-up of risk and alleviate tvolatility that is often seen as 
inherent to financialization. Of course, control is never absolute, and the exchanges 
sometimes fail at this task as demonstrated by the 2015 market crash. However, through 
exchanges the state aims to control some of financialization’s negative repercussions. 
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Retail investors: stabilising the socio-political system 
Capital markets are also used as a way to facilitate social stability in China. In the absence 
of a sufficient public social security system and a simultaneous strain on the familial 
social security system due to the legacy of the one-child policy and a (consequently) 
aging population – investing into the stock market serves as a fix, facilitating the creation 
of a stock trading culture and a financialization of everyday life (Dal Maso, 2015). Already 
in the 1990s, slogans such as ‘getting rich is glorious’ animated millions of retail investors 
to invest into stocks (Walter and Howie, 2001). By now, the promise of a Chinese dream, 
socialism with Chinese characteristics and political stability are all intricately linked with 
the performance of the stock market. From less than 50 million trading accounts in 1999, 
more than 168 million trading accounts existed in the Chinese stock market alone by 
2013 and 90 per cent of trading was conducted by these mom and pop investors.21 As a 
result, the performance of the stock market occupies a much more politically sensitive 
space than in many other countries. As one Hong Kong-based, former broker noted: 
The authorities in mainland China don’t want all their newly wealthy to be 
vulnerable to that type of activity. So, they are trying very hard to limit the damage 
that could be wreaked by sophisticated financial services practitioners on what are 
relatively inexperienced, knowledge-less new wealthy.22 
As the literature on ‘responsive authoritarianism’ highlights, party-based authoritarian 
regimes such as China often rely upon support of a growing middle class to remain in 
power (Heurlin, 2016).23 Therefore, protecting retail investors is an important task for 
the exchanges. As many retail investors in China are notorious gamblers and their 
trading activity is often driven by rumours, the exchanges’ above-mentioned system of 
risk monitoring and management is used in a delicate balancing act between allowing 
retail investors to participate in capital markets but also to reduce the volatility that they 
bring to markets and to protect them from themselves as well as more sophisticated 
investors. In a lot of interviews, retail investors were described as ‘children’, ‘financially 
illiterate’ and ‘gamblers’ who traded via their smartphones (often during their normal 
job), and needed to be protected from themselves (e.g. getting burned in market 
swings) and others (e.g. ‘predatory’ professional investors) by the paternal exchanges 
and regulators. As one interviewee working for a global exchange’s China business 
development team put it: 
I feel that the Chinese regulators are sometimes like parents, they have to take care 
of their little kid, retail investors are like the last, youngest, little kid. Whereas the 
institutions are relatively alright, the kid can be doing nonsense, he doesn’t know 
what he’s doing, he’s not reasonable… But once he got hurt and then he’s crying, 
the parent has to do something about it, right?24 
The authorities do not want investors protesting on the streets because they lost money 
in the stock market. Therefore, as several Chinese exchange representatives noted in an 
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interview, in order to protect retail investors, ‘the biggest principle of China’s [capital] 
market is fairness’,25 and the capital markets organized by Chinese exchanges are 
designed to facilitate this objective – effectively acting as intermediaries between the 
Chinese state and society. To be clear, this was not always the case. As one Chinese 
hedge fund manager noted: ’10–20 years ago, you could make a lot of money in the 
market with such business, manipulating prices et cetera. But now, the exchanges have 
developed and have much better systems. Back then, it was a jungle… it still is, but it’s 
not so barbaric anymore. […] I always advise friends to not do anything stupid, because 
[now] the Big Brother will know sooner or later’.26 After several scandals in the 1990s 
where for instance brokers misused client funds, exchanges started to extensively 
monitor brokers’ activities and to clamp down on fraudulent behaviour such as market 
manipulations or insider trading.  
As one Chinese private equity manager noted, ‘[today] some of the policy is 
actually more in favour of the retail investors than the institutionals’.27 Stock exchanges 
for instance do not sell real-time market data which would give professional investors 
an advantage over retail investors. As mentioned, market data is instead published in 
bundles, which as one China-based foreign asset manager stated is ‘good for lay people, 
but bad for professional investors’.28 The stock exchanges also deliberately decided to 
stop intraday trading. On the one hand, this was established to keep retail investors 
from trading too much and to protect them from market movements. As an interviewee 
working for the international department of a Chinese exchange told me: ‘Yes, we have 
t+1. […] In the past we tried t+0, but you know… many retail investors will trade all the 
time… So, we introduced some limitation for them, […]. The regulator thinks that with 
t+0 we would add risk, […] that some investors will trade too frequently, and it will not 
be good for the market’.29 On the other hand, this setup makes HFT trading impossible 
in the stock market, so sophisticated traders cannot gain an edge over lay traders. 
Similarly, exchanges require companies to make announcements that have an impact 
on share prices after trading hours. In contrast to global markets, where announcements 
need to be made asap, the rationale in China is to not disadvantage retail investors as 
these usually work during trading hours and can therefore not react to this 
information.30 
The exchanges also have policies in place to protect retail investors from 
themselves, by for instance facilitating investor professionalization and conducting/ 
sponsoring many training and education activities. As Wójcik (2012, p. 121) noted in his 
analysis of the Warsaw Stock Exchange, one important activity of exchanges is to 
‘educate investors […] which is particularly important in the context of a country where 
stock market did not exist for over half a century before 1991’. Consequently, brokers 
that want to host marketing events can apply for funding from exchanges, under the 
condition that they also provide such educational sessions.31 In order to trade index 
futures or options, the exchanges also require investors to take exams, so that they gain 
a better understanding about what they are trading (and to reduce trading by 
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uninformed investors). Further, the exchanges attempt to make it harder to access 
certain market segments by introducing high entry requirements. Investors participating 
in the Hong Kong Stock Connect for instance need to hold an aggregate balance of at 
least RMB 500,000 in their account (HKEx, 2019) and when designing the new 
internationally accessible crude oil contract, the contract specifications were altered 
from 1,000 to 10,000 lots – i.e. increasing the price 10-fold – in part to prevent too much 
retail participation.32  
Overall, capital markets play an important role in the social fabric of Chinese 
authoritarian capitalism. In the interest of harmony and social stability, retail investors 
were both encouraged to participate in the market but also needed to be protected 
from severe losses and unfair market practices. However, this created political risks for 
the authorities. Here, the Chinese exchanges play an important role in this balancing act, 
managing and directing financialization to mitigate the relationship between the 
Chinese state, society and capital markets in its transition towards a more financialized 
political economy. 
 
Real economy: assessing the social usefulness of finance 
Another important aspect of financialization processes is the relationship between 
finance and the real economy. In the financialization literature, many scholars highlight 
that increasing financialization often negatively affects real economic development 
(Krippner, 2005; Stein, 2011). What can be observed in the actions of Chinese exchanges 
are attempts to mitigate this development. One phrase that is often invoked by Chinese 
authorities is that ‘finance should serve the real economy’,33 a notion that was 
reinforced in 2015 when Xi Jinping emphasized that ‘serving the real economy is the 
bounden duty and purpose of the financial sector’.34 
 Consequently, assessments about the social usefulness of financial trading are 
made. Financial derivatives for instance are viewed with a lot of suspicion by the 
authorities and strict rules apply. While similar rules exist for commodity derivatives, 
they are not quite as stringent because the authorities believe that they better serve the 
real economy as companies (might) use them for hedging purposes instead of 
speculation.35 The Chinese exchanges try to ensure this through their contract 
specifications; strict position limits and hedging quotas play an important role here 
(discussed above). Further, almost all contracts on Chinese futures exchanges need to 
be physically delivered.36 This is in stark contrast to international markets where almost 
all contracts are cash settled as there is no mandate or interest to actively encourage 
actual commodity trading.37 The Chinese exchanges also engage in many educational 
activities to get commodity companies, e.g. steel mills, mining, energy or food-
processing companies to hedge their risk in commodity markets.38 
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Chinese exchanges are also aiming to assist national development goals by 
facilitating China’s (commodity) pricing power. As commodity futures prices are used as 
reference points for physical trading, the Chinese exchanges aim to gain sufficient 
market share to gain benchmark status and thereby have a say in the global pricing of 
commodities. Free market advocates argue that these prices are set by markets and that 
it is ‘absurd’ that China wants to have a ‘say’ in commodity pricing.39 However, from a 
national development perspective, this makes sense as prices created in Chinese 
markets would better reflect local demand and supply rather than prices determined in 
the United States where Chinese companies felt they had to pay a premium. As the 
China business development team of a global exchange noted: 
Every five years they need to agree on a price with the Australian iron ore producer 
backed by the Western buying power, and they always got very ripped off in the 
negotiations, you know, because you have to mark reference to the market price 
and the market didn’t take place anywhere near you, it takes place globally… so, 
that’s something the government is putting focus on.40 
Having their own benchmarks would give Chinese companies ‘better’ prices than 
the global prices they have to accept otherwise – which are set in Chicago, New York 
and London. Further, as the research department of a Chinese exchange noted, Chinese 
companies and authorities have ‘no good relations to the Fed and financial officials in 
the US’;41 but if these markets were situated in China and regulated by Chinese 
exchanges, the authorities could exert more control over them. Hence, to gain 
commodity pricing power the Chinese exchanges carefully made strategically important 
commodity contracts (crude oil, iron ore, PTE) accessible to international investors. A 
year after being launched in March 2018, the Shanghai crude oil contract for instance 
gained a market share of 16 per cent in global oil futures markets, displacing Dubai as 
the world’s third-largest benchmark, while the market shares of WTI and Brent dropped 
from 60 to 52 per cent and from 38 to 32 per cent, respectively (Evans, 2018). As Fang 
Xinghai, Vice Chairman of the CSRC, noted in 2016: ‘[China] is facing the chance of a 
lifetime to become a global pricing center for commodities […] it would be a “historic 
mistake” not to grasp [this] rare opportunity’ (cited in Tan, 2017). 
A similar rationale explains China developing an onshore financial futures 
market. In an effort to develop Chinese financial services, in 2000 a joint venture 
between FTSE and Xinhua Finance was established to create indices on Chinese stocks 
(A-shares). But unbeknownst to the Chinese authorities, FTSE-Xinhua signed an 
agreement with Singapore Exchange (SGX), licensing an index to create a financial 
futures contract.42 While initially disregarding the contract, as it started gaining traction, 
the Chinese authorities became increasingly concerned. Domestic stock markets started 
to behave weirdly – more and more often stock prices in China were driven by the 
futures contract traded in Singapore; the tail was wagging the dog. Suddenly, these ‘A50 
Futures had pricing power over the A-shares market’.43 As Euromoney noted, there was 
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‘an uneasiness in China at the idea that derivatives on Chinese stocks and instruments 
can be traded somewhere else in the world with absolutely no control from the People’s 
Republic itself’ (emphasis added; Wright, 2006). As immediate response, Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE) sued SGX for using its market data. But more importantly, this facilitated 
the development of Chinese onshore financial futures. As the research department of a 
Chinese exchange noted, the (previously discussed) ‘CSI 300 was a reply to the A50 
Futures, the A50 pushed forward the Chinese government to make a quick decision’.44 
While the Chinese authorities were originally against building domestic financial futures 
markets after the failure of bond futures in the 1990s, the success of the offshore A50 
contract forced the creation of CFFEX and a Chinese index futures market. When CSI 300 
futures were launched in 2010, the process had been sped up significantly in order to 
regain control. With their own contract in place, the Chinese exchanges could manage 
their domestic markets instead of letting a foreign exchange decide the rules of the 
game and let foreign speculators distort their domestic stock markets. 
Overall, there is an assessment of the social usefulness of finance (financial vs 
commodity futures) and how it can contribute to (commodity pricing) – or at least not 
interfere with (SGX-A50) – the real economy and national economic development. The 
actions of China’s exchanges aim to facilitate such policy outcomes, in an attempt to 
offset some of the negative consequences of financialization processes which often 
disadvantage the real economy vis-à-vis finance. 
 
Reform: restructuring China’s companies 
The liberalization and opening of financial markets have been part of a larger trend in 
China towards allowing a greater role for markets in its economy, including the 
governance of Chinese companies. In global capital markets, the premise of a listing is a 
transfer of control (i.e. ownership) in return for funding. However, this often 
significantly changes the incentives and behaviour of listed companies, exemplified by 
the move towards shareholder value orientation (Aglietta and Breton, 2001; Williams, 
2000). In China, the political-economic function of capital markets for listed companies 
however differs. Instead of raising funds, capital markets rather helped to reform 
Chinese companies while maintaining control over them by reforming SOEs and 
facilitating their international standing and recognition. The exchanges facilitate these 
reform processes by acting as intermediaries between the Chinese state and listed 
companies.  
While internationally the main function of stock markets is for companies to 
raise money, most exchange-listed companies in China are state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) with sufficient funding from state-owned banks. The state’s role is also not 
diminished through the (often only partial) listing of SOEs – its control instead changed 
from direct ownership to often becoming the largest shareholder (see Y. Wang, 2015). 
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But as a result of partial listings, Chinese SOEs became more efficiently run, less wasteful 
companies, adopting ‘modern’ corporate governance structures and receiving know-
how from strategic international investors. As a Frankfurt-based exchange 
representative noted, ‘you know, the purpose of stock markets in China was to reform 
SOEs’.45 In the form of ‘publicly’ listed companies, these Chinese companies gained a 
certain legitimacy in international markets.46 Getting listed in China is a lengthy process 
with many administrative hurdles and strict requirements and whoever gets listed has a 
‘seal of approval’ from the government which enables them to engage in global M&A 
activities with somewhat less scrutiny, as a managing partner of a Beijing-based law firm 
noted.47 Overall, listing companies was a way of grooming national champions and to 
facilitate a national development strategy (Heilmann, 2008). 
The Chinese stock exchanges were vital in this process: educating companies 
about international best practice, setting corporate governance standards for listed 
companies and monitoring compliance with these standards.48 While companies might 
not fully follow these rules, significant discrepancies or violations will be picked up by 
the exchanges’ investigation teams. As a Chinese regulator stated, ‘if they didn’t do that 
[follow window guidance], the result could be disastrous… they might be investigated 
more often, the exchanges would take a closer look at the board… […] companies don’t 
want the regulators to pay attention’.49  
This monitoring and intervening role of the exchanges could also be observed 
during the MSCI inclusion process.50 After years of consultations and negotiations, in 
June 2018, index provider MSCI decided to include Chinese A-share stocks into its 
indices, triggering estimated investment flows of USD80bn into Chinese capital markets 
(Wright, 2019). This represented a milestone for China’s opening process. It was 
enormously prestigious for the Chinese authorities and an ‘accolade’ that showed 
China’s increased recognition in the international investment community; the head of a 
global bank’s European FX trading desk likened it to ‘basically China’s ascent into the 
Champions League’.51 However, preconditions were that included shares could be 
traded by foreign investors relatively freely (accomplished through the Stock Connects; 
next section) and that included companies meet MSCI’s corporate governance 
standards. Thereby, Chinese exchanges ‘would also brief companies before MSCI came 
to visit them, so that they knew what to tell MSCI’,52 as well as hosting multiple events 
to educate companies about how to comply with MSCI’s governance framework.53 
In contrast to neoliberal norms of financialization, in China neither has 
shareholder value orientation taken over nor state control been undermined. An open 
question remains whether this process also created the conditions for other (potentially 
negative) developments, as this enabled cash-rich listed companies to engage in trophy 
purchases or to evade solvency constraints.54 Overall, capital markets played an 
important role in helping to restructure China’s economy and raise the international 
recognition and competitiveness of its companies. By monitoring and facilitating capital 
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market development, the Chinese exchanges helped to manage the reform of China’s 
companies within this financialization process. 
 
Maintaining control… despite international investors 
Another important characteristic of financialization processes is the integration with 
global markets and investors. In the financialization literature, the ability of international 
investors to withdraw their funds is often described as a disciplinary mechanism in case 
countries do not follow a neoliberal rulebook (Bortz and Kaltenbrunner, 2018; Hardie, 
2012). But while China’s capital markets have been increasingly accessible for 
international investors (Li, 2018a), instead of opening the floodgates China’s financial 
opening enables foreign investor participation while maintaining state control. The 
exchanges hereby act as intermediaries between the Chinese state and global finance. 
The Chinese authorities have an ambiguous relationship with global investors. 
As the CEO of a Hong-Kong based asset manager stated, ‘it’s absolutely a love and hate 
story, they love the money, love the stability, hate giving up control… and hate it if 
foreign investors want to dominate the terms’.55 On the one side, foreign investor 
participation helps to professionalize China’s financial industry which is crucial for its 
aspirations to becoming a global financial powerhouse. When talking about 
international proprietary trading firms operating in China, one Shanghai-based foreign 
asset manager noted: ‘Optiver did not fight its way into China, they are tolerated by the 
exchanges, the authorities – and Optiver pays with its know-how. […] I am sure they 
must employ only Chinese people who learn from them’.56 International players are let 
in to train/educate local firms, making them fit for global markets, a logic similar to 
listing SOEs in order to create globally competitive national champions (Heilmann, 
2008). On the other side, the authorities are wary of losing control over markets through 
an increasing influx of foreign money.57 Especially as maintaining capital controls, 
controlling its currency exchange rate and financial system are core pillars of the Chinese 
economies’ authoritarian governance. Therefore, the Chinese exchanges organize 
market infrastructures that enable foreign investor participation while simultaneously 
maintaining control over their markets.  
While foreigners are not allowed to freely participate in Chinese markets, they 
can access Chinese markets in a controlled manner.58 Foreign companies are allowed to 
access markets if they establish local entities, co-called wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises (WFOEs). What seems like a creative way around Chinese regulations that 
ban foreigners from trading, setting up WFOEs is accepted by the authorities – because 
these companies are registered in China and therefore subject to Chinese laws and 
regulatory control.59 The authorities decide who gets WFOE licenses, the process is very 
thorough, WFOEs cannot easily expatriate their funds/profits (capital controls), and the 
regulators define which of their activities are legitimate. Because it is a grey area, the 
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regulators always have ‘probable cause’60 against these foreign investors – which are 
ideal scapegoats to deflect the anger of afflicted Chinese retail investors during a market 
downturn. Instructive here is the case of Russian trading firm Yishidun International 
Trading whose trading on CFFEX was retroactively declared illegal, had to pay a 
considerably fine and was banned from trading indefinitely.61 So, although all the 
world’s large financial players are active in Chinese markets, monitored by the 
exchanges they have to play according to Chinese rules. In contrast to global markets, 
they are at the very bottom of the food chain. 
When it comes to trading into China from abroad, even more restrictions apply 
and the mechanisms that are in place to enable trading in and out of China are quite 
different from international markets. As the emerging markets strategist of a global 
exchange noted:  
I have an analogy… […] If you look at capital controls as a wall, people have 
eliminated them in different ways… and you can remove the wall, full liberalization, 
Big Bang, and that has a whole range of problems… you can remove it gradually… 
or you can do what the Chinese are doing and build holes through it. […] You build 
holes and then you think you can repair them if needed, and you leave the height 
of the wall more or less intact.62  
The first such mechanisms were the QFII and RQFII investor schemes in 2003, where 
investors had to apply for quotas (see Töpfer, 2017). However, the real turning point in 
opening up Chinese markets was the establishment of the Stock Connects between 
Hong Kong, Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2014/2016. Basically, the Stock Connect enables 
traders who can access HKEx to trade stocks on SSE via HKEx, and vice versa.63 However, 
for the Connects, ‘home-rules’ apply. International investors in Hong Kong must adhere 
to the previously identified characteristics of Chinese markets such as limited order 
types, data availability or t+1 (no intra-day trading). Further, as of September 2018, the 
‘pass-through monitoring system’ to identify individual investors was also applied to the 
Stock Connect, so that Chinese exchanges can now monitor the trading activities of 
every single international investor trading China through the Connects, a massive 
departure from international practice.64  
The Connect Schemes are also ‘closed loops’. This means that if mainland 
investors invest in HKEx-listed shares through the Connect and decide to sell these, the 
resulting HKD-denominated proceeds get transferred into RMB and channelled back to 
the investor’s mainland account (and vice versa). So, while order routing and transaction 
flows between the two markets are enabled, capital controls remain completely intact. 
In addition, if trading gets too wild, the exchanges can restrict trading. As HKEx’s group 
strategy department stated, ‘with Stock Connect you have this beautiful sort of capital 
control mechanism […] they [the Chinese exchanges] can always turn off the tap…’65 The 
Stock Connects are hence designed by Chinese exchanges to simultaneously open their 
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markets to global investors, while maintaining their market monitoring and surveillance 
machinery as well as capital controls.  
This controlled international integration of China’s capital markets is also a key 
point in the US-China trade war negotiations, where the United States is trying to 
facilitate a more encompassing opening of China’s financial system. As a response, the 
Chinese authorities have liberalized some aspects of their markets, especially removing 
foreign ownership caps on certain financial institutions. However, even if foreign 
investors can soon fully own brokers and asset managers, these foreign firms are still 
registered in China, subject to capital controls and must adhere to the rules set out by 
Chinese exchanges the same way as Chinese entities or WFOEs.66 As one Chinese broker 
noted, ‘[while] the regulations have been changing in the last two years, what is not 
changing is the infrastructure. […] Yes, the regulation is seemingly becoming more 
international, [but] they will never change the infrastructure because this is where they 
can exercise the power’.67 This was also confirmed by a Chinese regulator’s research 
department who noted that while there is ‘closer alignment towards international 
practices’ with respect to financial regulations resulting from the trade war, ‘the 
infrastructural arrangements stay the same – because this is where you can control the 
market!’68 From this perspective, while accelerating the opening up process, the current 
‘concessions’ made by the Chinese government do not represent a break with the pre-
existing path. 
So, while Chinese capital markets are increasingly integrated with global 
markets, Chinese exchanges govern these markets quite differently, forcing 
international investors to play according to Chinese rules, hence maintaining state 
control within capital markets despite an increasingly contested opening process.  
 
Conclusion: the politics of variegated financialization in China’s authoritarian 
capitalism 
While one can observe an increasing financialization in China, this process unfolds within 
the context of China’s authoritarian capitalism. This paper analyzed the development of 
China’s capital markets and how Chinese state-owned exchanges engage in processes 
of market management, thereby acting as intermediaries between the Chinese state, 
society and finance. Rather than a break with China’s authoritarian capitalism, the 
activities of Chinese exchanges help to sustain and facilitate China’s existing socio-
economic system through steering the financialization process. As a result, Chinese 
capital markets function quite differently from ‘global’ markets, as they are organized 
with controlling markets and directing their outcomes towards state policies as their 
underlying principles. The active management of capital markets through Chinese 
exchanges addresses different parts of China’s socio-economic system and aim to: 
prevent the building up of excessive financial risks (financial sector); stabilize the socio-
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political system by simultaneously encouraging and protecting retail investor 
participation (society); assess the usefulness of financial activities and their contribution 
to the real economy (national development); and assist in the reform of Chinese 
corporations (non-financial sector); while maintaining control despite an increased 
opening to international investors. Rather than enforcing relative conformity with a 
neoliberal hegemonic project (Carroll and Jarvis, 2014), within the variegated 
financialization of China’s political economy exchanges sustain and facilitate the 
development of Chinese authoritarian capitalism.  
The findings of this paper are still somewhat stylized. Processes on the ground 
are often more chaotic, control over capital markets is neither complete nor always 
effective as the 2015 stock market crash demonstrated. Future research is therefore 
needed to more closely assess the degree and effectiveness of these control measures, 
how these vary across different segments of China’s authoritarian capitalism and how 
they interact with global financial arrangements. It is important to note that even if 
actively facilitated to create economic growth and partially steered by the state, like any 
financialization process, China’s variegated financialization is still inherently crisis-
prone, creates new contradictions, and some effects of financialization such as rising 
wealth and income inequality or a financialization of everyday life severely affect 
Chinese society. However, this paper rather aims to showcase the development of a 
different way of thinking about and managing of capital markets in China where the 
state attempts to steer and shape parts of China’s variegated financialization which is 
not necessarily linked to neoliberalism but unfolds within the context of authoritarian 
capitalism. And while many political economy scholars would surely welcome such 
restraints of unfettered ‘global’ finance, it is important to note that in the Chinese case 
this process is integrally linked to other elements of China’s political and socio-economic 
system whose implementation many would probably not support. 
Contributing to the literatures on variegated financialization and the state, this 
paper argues that states cannot only be important actors that facilitate financialization, 
but that they can also exercise a considerable degree of control over specific aspects of 
financialization processes, shaping their very form and political outcomes. In the 
Chinese case, that exchanges are state-owned has important consequences for how 
they manage capital markets, facilitating the state-controlled nature of financialization 
within the context of China’s authoritarian capitalism. By highlighting the role of 
exchanges as ‘pivotal points’ for managing capital markets, this paper also contributes 
to the growing literature on the importance of market actors and infrastructures in 
finance (Bernards and Campbell-Verduyn, 2019). Building on this single case study, 
future research could investigate whether such state-controlled processes of 
financialization also exists in other countries where the state maintains a strong role 
within the economy (Nölke et al., 2019). Such an analysis could shed light on whether 
this is a uniquely Chinese phenomenon, intrinsically linked to an authoritarian political 
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system, or a question of state capacity. This could further contribute to ongoing debates 
on convergence, models of capitalisms and trajectories of financialization. 
Since the GFC, China has become the world economy’s engine, accounting for 45 
per cent of global GDP growth (The Economist, 2018). Its capital markets have 
developed and internationalized to an unprecedented degree, turning China into an 
important player in global finance, but one that plays according to its own rules. This 
situation has created rising tensions, especially with the United States, culminating in 
the current US-China trade war. A large point of contention in these negotiations is the 
opening up of China’s financial markets. However, while Chinese financial regulations 
seem to approach international norms, the infrastructural arrangements that enable the 
Chinese authorities to manage capital markets have remained unchanged. From this 
perspective, the ‘concessions’ made by the Chinese government do not deviate from 
the pre-existing path of gradually opening up its markets while maintaining control. In 
the face of this systemic competition between different ways of organising financial and 
economic life, more research is required to understand the mechanisms, form and 
content of this financialization with Chinese characteristics and its place within China’s 
authoritarian capitalism.  
 
Notes 
1. Measured by the ratio of stocks traded to credit provision as per cent of GDP; see Karwowski 
and Stockhammer (2017). 
2. In comparison, for the United States (2014–2017) the average market- versus-bank activity 
was 0.93, the value of stocks traded 220.8 per cent and market capitalization 150.5 per 
cent of GDP (World Bank, 2018). The United States accounted for 33 per cent of global 
futures market trading (FIA, 2017) and finance/insurance contributed 7.5 per cent to it’s 
GDP (https://www.selectusa.gov/financial-services-industry-united-states). 
3. Interview: Chinese hedge fund manager (Shanghai, 16/04/2018). 
4. This finding is in line with Gruin’s (2019b) analysis of China’s digital credit scoring which he 
describes as another way ‘in which advances in financial technology open up new 
opportunities for socio-economic “development” as well as the exercise of political 
authority’. 
5. Interview: China, 05/07/2017. 
6. Interview: research department of exchange (China, 18/10/2018). 
7. On the significance of policy experimentation for China’s economic development, see 
Heilmann (2008). 
8. Interview: Hong Kong, 26/09/2018. 
9. Observation: ‘Global exchange leaders’ panel, FIA Asia Derivatives Conference (Singapore, 
29/11/2017). 
10. Interview: Chinese hedge fund manager (Shanghai, 16/04/2018). 
11. Interview: international department of Chinese broker (Shanghai, 26/04/2018). 





13. Interview: Hong Kong, 30/07/2017. 
14. Interview: research department of regulator (Beijing, 30/10/2018). 
15. Interview: consultant of Chinese exchange (Shanghai, 09/05/2018). 
16. Interview: Beijing, 07/11/2018. 
17. Interview: international department of international broker (Hong Kong, 26/09/2018). 
18. Interview: international department of Chinese broker (Shenzhen, 18/05/2018). 
19. Interview: Beijing, 29/10/2018. 
20. Interview: research department of exchange (China, 18/10/2018). 
21. Speech: CSRC chairman Guo Shuqing ‘To develop a more open and inclusive capital market 
in China’, Asian Financial Forum (Hong Kong, 14/01/2013). 
22. Interview: Hong Kong, 06/07/2017. 
23. Sum (2019) refers to this as ‘performance legitimacy’. 
24. Interview: Hong Kong, 07/07/2017. 
25. Interview: Shanghai, 11/05/2018. 
26. Interview: Shanghai, 24/09/2019. 
27. Interview: Hong Kong, 22/07/2017. 
28. Interview: Shanghai, 15/05/2018. 
29. Interview: Shanghai, 26/04/2018. 
30. Interview: emerging markets strategist of global exchange (London, 11/01/2018). 
31. Interview: Chinese hedge fund manager (Shanghai, 16/04/2018). 
32. Observation: ‘Crude oil and building international pricing’ panel, FOW Derivatives World Asia 
Conference (Hong Kong, 11/04/2018). 
33. This was prominently discussed at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of China (12/11/2013). 
34. Speech: 5th National Financial Work Conference (Beijing, 14/07/2017). 
35. Interview: derivatives department of Chinese broker (Hangzhou, 24/04/2018). 
36. Only index futures are cash settled, even bond futures and options are physically delivered. 
37. Interview: department head of commodity trading platform (Hangzhou, 22/04/2018). 
38. Observation: Iron Ore Futures Internationalization Symposium (Dalian, 15/10/2018). 
39. Interview: consultant of Chinese exchange (Shanghai, 09/05/2018). 
40. Interview: Hong Kong, 07/07/2017. 
41. Interview: China, 18/10/2018. 
42. Interview: business development of index provider (Hong Kong, 27/09/2018). 
43. Interview: research department of exchange (China, 18/10/2018). 
44. Interview: China, 18/10/2018. 
45. Interview: business development of exchange (Frankfurt, 02/02/2018). 
46. Interview: managing partner of Chinese law firm (Beijing, 18/10/2018). 
47. Interview: Beijing, 18/10/2018. 
48. Interview: research department of regulator (Beijing, 31/10/2018). 
49. Interview: research department of regulator (Beijing, 30/10/2018). 
50. On China’s MSCI inclusion and the politics of index inclusions, see Petry et al. (2019). 
51. Interview: Frankfurt, 25/01/2018. 
52. Interview: research department of regulator (Beijing, 30/10/2018). 
53. Interview: international department of exchange (Shanghai, 26/04/2018). 
54. I thank a reviewer for mentioning this point. 
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55. Interview: Hong Kong, 28/07/2017. 
56. Interview: managing partner of asset manager (Shanghai, 15/05/2018). 
57. Interview: Chinese private equity firm (Hong Kong, 22/07/2017). 
58. Interview: managing partner of Chinese asset manager (Shanghai, 15/05/2018). 
59. Interview: research department of Chinese exchange (Shanghai, 14/05/2018). 
60. Interview: consultant of Chinese exchange (Shanghai, 08/05/2018). 
61. Interview: business development department of global exchange (Hong Kong, 24/07/2017). 
62. Interview; London, 11/01/2018. 
63. In addition, the Hong Kong-China Bond Connect was launched in 2017. 
64. Overall, Hong Kong is an important gateway and facilitator of China’s opening process (Li, 
2018b). 
65. Interview: Hong Kong, 30/07/2017. 
66. In addition, foreign firms would have difficulties attracting business from Chinese retail 
investors; interview: managing director of commodity trading platform (China, 
25/10/2019). 
67. Interview: Beijing, 12/09/2019. 
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